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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
--vs.TO}f?\f"f OTIS FAIR,
Defendarn.t and Appellant.

)
.
>

)

Case
No. 9244

BRIEF OF RESPONDEN'T

ST1\TEl\IENT OF FACTS
Appellant Fair was convicted January 20, 1960, in
rr·hird District Court of unlawful possession of a narcotic drug. He had competent counsel at the trial but
now represents himself. The evidence showed Fair was
visiting the Abyss, a Salt Lake City night club, when t'Yo
police officers, acting on an informant's tip, approached
him and asked him to step outside, where he "\vas searched
and arrested. ( T. 24, 29) The officers found cigarettes
which later proved to contain marijuana. He 'vas sentenced to prison for the statutory term.
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STATEMENT OF POINTS
I.
APPELLANT'S CONVICTION SHOULD NOT BE REVERSED BECAUSE OF THE MANNER OF HIS SEARCH
AND ARREST BY THE POLICE OFFICERS.
PoiNT

II.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING
APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR A BILL OF PARTICULARS AS TO CERTAIN FACTS NOT INTRODUCED
I~JTO EVIDENCE.
PoiNT

III.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ITS INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY.
PoiNT

PoiNT

IV.

JUROR RIGBY DID NOT INDICATE THAT HE
\VOULD VOTE FOR A VERDICT PARTIAL TO EITHER
SIDE.
ARGU~IENT

PoiNT

I.

APPELLANT'S CONVICTION SHOULD NOT BE RE\rERSED BECAUSE OF THE MANNER OF HIS SEARCH
AND ARREST BY THE POLICE OFFICERS.
Because of the language and style of appellant ~s
brief, prepared 'vithout assistance of counsel, isolating
the points relied upon has been difficult. Respondent has
attempted to do so, ho,vever, and to ans,ver them in
order.

2
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The first point seems to be that appellant \vas improperly convicted in that he w·as accompanied from the
night clnb to an alley and there searched by the officers,
\Yithout a warrant, and arrested. (T. 24, 29) The search
was an incident to Fair's arrest and was conducted almost
simultaneously with it. (T. 31)
Admittedly, there IS some law tending to require
the arrest to be made prior to the search. If that is true
in Utah and if the search and arrest are not to be deemed
a simultaneous act, the search being incident to the arrest,
appellant may possibly have a cause of action against
the arresting officers; and the officers may be in technical
violation of the law. However, none of the events that
occurred can in any way invalidate the evidence, nor does
the use thereof violate the Utah Constitution.
The leading case in this matter is State v. Ai1ne,. 62
U. 476, 220 P. 704, 32 A. L. R. 375. It "\Vas held thus that
articles taken from an accused are not inadmissible in
evidence against him because taken in violation of the
constitutional provision of the Utah State Constitution.
The court further held that the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the Federal Constitution do not apply to state
governments or proceedings in state courts, and that the
decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States as
to admissibility of evidence under the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments to the Federal Constitution are not binding
on state courts in interpreting similar provisions of their
own state constitutions. The court stated:

"* * * we are led by the force of what

deem
the better reason to conclude with the vast major\Ye
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ity of state courts that the admissibility of
evidence is not affected by the illegality of means
through which it has been obtained, * * *. ''
As to its reasoning for this decision, the Utah court
wrot~ as follows :

"* * * The rule and the legal principles supporting
it are stated in 4 Wigmore on Evidence, 2d ed.
§ 2183, as follows: 'Necessity does not require, and
the spirit of our law does forbid, the attempt to do
justice incidentally and to enforce penalties by
indirect methods. An employer may perhaps suitably interrupt the course of his business to deliver
a homily to his office boy on the evils of gambling
or the rewards of industry. But a judge does not
hold court in a street car to do summary justice
upon a fellow passenger who fraudulently evades
payment of his fare; and, upon the same principle,
he does not attempt, in the course of a specific
litigation, to investigate and punish all offenses,
"\\rhich incidentally cross the path of that litigation. Such a practice might be consistent \Yith
the primitive system of justice under an Arabian
sheik, but it does not comport with our own system of law. It offends, in the first place, by trying
a violation of law without that due complaint and
process which are indispensable for its correct
investigation. It offends, in the next place, by
interrupting, delaying and confusing the investigation in hand, for the sake of a matter \Yhich is
not a part of it. It offends further in that it does
this unnecessarily and gratuitously; for, since the
persons injured by the tnlpposed offense have not
chosen to seek redress or punishment directly and
immediately, at the right time and by the proper
process, there is clearly no call to attend to their
complaints in this indirect and tardy manner. The
4
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judicial rules of evidence were never meant to be
an indirect process of punishment. It is not only
anomalous to distort them to that end, but it is
improper (in the absence of express statute) to
enlarge the fixed penalty of the law, that of fine
or imprisonment, by adding to it the forfeiture of
some civil right through loss of the means of proving it. The illegality is by no means condoned; it
is merely ignored. For these reasons it has long
been established that the admissibility of evidence
is not affected by the illegality of the means
through which the party has been enabled to obtain
the evidence.' ''
Notwithstanding whatever cause of action Fair may
have or whatever liability, if any, may accrue to the officers, appellant's conviction on the basis of the seized
evidence is valid and should not be overturned.

PorNT II.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING
APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR A BILL OF PARTICULARS AS TO CERTAIN FACTS NOT INTRODUCED
INTO EVIDENCE.
Appellant Fair, through counsel, and by written
motion, requested a. Bill of Particulars on January 5,
1960, as to ''the names of all persons known to the prosecuting attorney or to officers Schoenhardt, Hann, Adair,
Sperry, Kent or Park, or any of them, who claimed to
have knowledge of defendant's alleged possession of
marijuana prior to defendant's arrest on or about November 2, 1959." (R. 10)
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Previously, on January 4, 1960, the judge had indicated in response to an oral request by defendant's counsel that he would not at that time require the district
attorney to give the indicated information because of
its immateriality in the case, but that defendant could
file a formal motion for a Bill of Particulars by January
6, 1960. (R. 9)
After the January 4th hearing, the district attorney
verbally and by· authorization of the court gave certain
particulars of his case to defendant's attorney.
Another hearing was held on January 11, 1960 (R.
69), at which time the court considered the formal motion
for a Bill of Particulars relative to the specific question
raised above and again refused to require the district
attorney to give defendant any information as to informants whose tips had led to arrest - again on the grounds
of immateriality as to the charge \Yhich was brought under
provisions of 58-13-2, U. C. A., 1953 as amended. There is
no question that the judge was correct in not requiring the
district attorney to answer extraneous questions which did
not relate to any evidence introduced in the case and
vvhich were not essential to the elements thereof. Here
possession of the drug is the only element of the charge,
and the police officers alone discoYered the drugs on his
person. vVhy they searched him is not rna terial at all.
This is in clear accord \Yith the statute providing for
snch bills, 77-21-9, U. C. A. 1953.
No testimony about or by any informer ""'as giYen by
6
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the Htate at the trial and, therefore, the court's ruling was
in all respects proper.
If the defendant felt aggrieved by the judge's ruli~g,
he should have made a motion to quash in accordance with
the provisions of Title 77-23-3, U.C.A. 1953, and his failure to do so constituted a. waiver of the alleged defect.
PoiNT

III.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ITS INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY.
Appellant claims the court erred in its instructions
to the jury. He does not point out the number of the instructions to which he objects and does not properly identify them in any other way. He refers to certain pages
of the transcript, but such references do not deal with
instructions at all, nor does he offer any worthwhile arguments against the instructions as a whole.
Respondent cannot answer this point because of the
complete absence of information as to its nature.
PoiNT

IV.

JUROR RIGBY DID NOT INDICATE THAT HE
WOULD VOTE FOR A VERDICT PARTIAL TO EITHER
SIDE.
At T. 14, Juror Rigby made an inadvert slip of the
tongue when asked if he could give an impartial decision.
At line 18, he used the word "partial." Immediately, he
recognized his error and corrected it without prompting
to read, at line 20, ''impartial.''
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CONCLUSION
Appellant has not suffered any prejudicial error.
Due process has not been violated and his appeal should
be dismissed.
Respectfully submitted,
WALTER L. BUDGE
Attorney General
VERNON B. ROMNEY
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Resp-ondent
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